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KRISTIN MOODY-O'GRADY*

Nuclear Waste Dumping in the
Oceans: Has the Cold War Taught Us
Anything?
ABSTRACT
The United States and other internationalactors have relied without
much success on traditional approaches to contain environmental
damage done to our oceans by Russian dumping of nuclear waste.
Our arms control experience suggests that on-site inspection is
successful in situationswhere there is a lack of information or a lack
of trust. Using on-site inspection to gather information and bolster
trustcould amelioratethe problem of Russian dumping of radioactive
wastes into the ocean, so long as the political and financial costs of
on-site inspection do not prove to be prohibitively high.
I. THREATS TO NATURAL RESOURCES AS THREATS TO
PEACE-COLD WAR SOLUTIONS TO NEW AGE PROBLEMS?
Gone are the days when natural resources are considered in
solely an economic or allocative fashion. Instead, threats to natural
resources increasingly are seen as threats to international peace.
Traditionally, "peace" has been defined simply as "an absence of war."'
However, more progressive definitions of peace have been suggested:
By peace we mean the absence of violence in any given society,
both internal and external, direct and indirect. We further
mean the nonviolent results of equality of rights, by which
every member of that society, through nonviolent means,
it,
participates equally in decisional power which regulates
2
and the distribution of the resources which sustain it.

* Kristin Moody-O'Grady is a graduate of University of New Mexico School of Law. She
is currently an attorney-advisor for the Federal Transit Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation. Previously she was an Honors Attorney for the U.S. Department of
Transportation, a contractor to Sandia National Laboratories, and an international trade
specialist at the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. The
opinions expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of Ms. Moody-O'Grady, not of
the United States Government.
1. See generally BIRGIr BRocK-UTNE, EDUCATING FOR PEACE: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE I

(1985).
2. BROCK-UTNE, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added).
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Under this definition, when a country harms the environment at the
expense of the international community, it threatens international peace
and security.
Although natural resources play an important role in maintaining
peace and security, we do not have much experience with how to resolve
conflicts arising in this area. This has become only too evident recently,
as the United States and other international actors try to contain the
environmental damage being done to our oceans by Russian dumping of
nuclear waste. Traditional approaches have failed to gain Russian
compliance with international demands. How should we resolve this
conflict?
Since most of our experience with breaches of peace and security
is in the military area, perhaps we should look for solutions in our
military and nuclear experience. One of the most promising in the
military area, in terms of its transferability to the environmental realm,
is the use of on-site inspection in arms control agreements. On-site
inspection provisions in arms control agreements have been an effective
means for reducing past threats to peace and security.3 As the name
suggests, on-site inspection includes a variety of techniques in which
inspectors physically go to a certain site to verify that a signatory to an
arms control agreement is actually complying with the agreement.4 In
this Article, I suggest that many of the experiences gained from on-site
inspection provisions in arms control agreements can be transferred to the
environmental arena, particularly to the problem of Russian dumping of
radioactive wastes into the ocean.
II. THE PROBLEM-WHAT HAS RUSSIA DONE WRONG?
Long History of Radioactive Dumping
The irony of Russia's newfound openness is the extent to which
the rest of the world is discovering how much the former Soviet Union
was able to keep secret over the years. A recent report released by the
Russian Federation indicates that the Soviet Union misled world
authorities in asserting that it had never dumped radioactive waste into
the oceans.' The report was prepared by forty-six Russian experts,

3. For a more complete survey of treaties containing on-site inspection provisions,
evaluations of success/failure of on-site inspection provisions, et cetera, see the On-Site
Inspection Database, compiled by Sandia National Laboratories. This database contains
abstracts of a variety of resources discussing on-site inspection provisions in arms control
agreements.
4. See generally LAURENCE COsTN ET AL, ARMs CONTROL AND VERIFICATION (1992).
5. See generally FACTS AND PROULEMS RELATED TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL INSEAS
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headed by Dr. Aleksei Yablokov, the top environmental advisor to
Russian President Boris Yeltsin.6 The Yablokov report says the Soviet
Union dumped eighteen nuclear reactors from submarines and from a
nuclear icebreaker.7
The Yablokov report reveals that the Soviet Union dumped 2.5
million curies of radioactive waste into the oceans." This amount of
waste is twice the combined total radioactive waste dumped by twelve
other nuclear nations during the entire nuclear era.9 The amount
dumped is significant: for example, "the recent accident at the Tomsk-7
nuclear plant in Siberia is said to have released ten curies of radiation,"'"
and after the accident at Three Mile Island, a total of fifteen curies were
released. Of the eighteen reactors that were dumped, six contained highly
radioactive fuel and were deposited in the shallow waters of the Arctic
Ocean, the Sea of Japan, the Barents Sea, and the Kara Sea."
Vitaliy Lystsov, deputy director of the Russian ministry of
environment, who helped to prepare the Yablokov report, stated that the
reactor material is shielded by a mix of special polymers, cement, and
other compounds. This protective coating is supposed to keep the
radiation sealed off from the marine environment for at least five
centuries, according to Lystsov.12 However, no one has examined the
shield to see whether it is holding up. The Yablokov report is frank in
admitting failures in this area:
[The] container material is subject to corrosion. Metal containers fail in seawater after 10 years, and concrete ones in 30
years. All studies of radiation conditions since 1967 have been
performed in water areas located 50-100 kilometers from solid
radioactive waste disposal areas. Direct monitoring of radia-

ADJACENT TO THE TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (materials for a Report by the

Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea, Created
by Decree No. 613 of the Russian Federation President, October 24, 1992) [hereinafter
YABLOKOv REPORT]. On file with author.

6. Id.
7. YABLOKOv REPORT, supra note 5, at tbl. A4.

8. A curie is the amount of radiation given off by one gram of radium and, in any nuclear
material, is equal to the disintegration of thirty-seven billion atoms per second. An old-style
luminous watch dial with twelve radium dots emitted about three one-thousandths of a
curie of radiation.
9. YABLOKOV REPORT, supra note 5, at § 1.2.
10. William J. Broad, Study Says Soviets Dumped Nuclear Reactors Into Sea, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Apr. 27, 1993, at 5A.
11. Senator Frank Murkowski, Russia Has to Clean Up Nuclear Weapons Dumped in Sea,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File.

12. Hal Bemton, Russian Revelations Indicate Arctic Region Is Awash in Contaminants,
WASHINGTON POST, May 17, 1993, at A3.
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tion conditions in such waste disposal areas themselves has
not been performed for 25 years.
Other incidents of radioactive contamination are also being
revealed. From 1948 to 1952, in one of the "secret cities" of the former
Soviet Union, Chelyabinsk-65, weapons producers dumped radioactive
waste directly into a river that served as the source of drinking water for
28,000 downstream residents. 4 In addition, severely contaminated
Russian rivers have been pouring radioactive contaminants, polyvinyl
chlorides, heavy metals, and raw sewage into the once pristine Arctic
Ocean. "Although the Arctic Ocean represents only 1.5 percent of the
world's ocean volume, it receives roughly 10 percent of the planet's river
discharges," according to the University of Washington's Polar Science
Center.' 5 "Underground atomic bomb explosions have fouled ground
water that flows into some rivers laInd a once-secret plutonium plant at
Krasnayarsk has for decades been bleeding wastes into the Ob, one of
Russia's largest rivers."16 Heavy metals and PCBs exist in many Arctic
plants and animals.' 7 These are only a few examples of the many
environmental disasters unfolding in the era of glasnost.
Recent Dumping in the Sea of Japan
The international community has recently voiced concern about
Russia's practice of dumping low-level radioactive waste into the seas' s
Russia confirmed on October 18, 1993, that "one of its tankers dumped
900 tons of liquid nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan." 9 It also confirmed
plans to dump another 800 tons by November 15. o This dump was later
postponed.' The Russian Federation is a signatory to the London
Convention-formally the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972-which is a
The
treaty under the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Convention bans the dumping of high-level radioactive wastes listed in
13. YABLOKOV REPORT, supra note 5, at § 3.1.
14. .d.
15. Hal Bernton, Russian Revelations Indicate Arctic Region Is Awash in Contaminants,
WASHINGTON POST, May 17, 1993, at A3.
16. Id.

17. Scott A. Hajost & Stephanie L. Pfirman, Arctic Pollution Cleanup Overdue, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONTrOR, Feb. 8, 1993, at 18.
18. Nuclear Dumping Ban, CHRIs AN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 23, 1993, at 18.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea:
Final Documents, Nov. 13, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1291. [hereinafter London Convention].
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Annex I, and the signatories recently agreed to a moratorium on
dumping of other radioactive wastes listed in Annex II, except under
special circumstances. However, dumping of "unpackaged liquid
radioactive waste" is prohibited.' Pursuant to this treaty, the Russian
Federation Ministry of Protection of the Environment & Natural
Resources wrote a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) on October 5, 1993, that warned of the dumping to take place in
the Sea of Japan.2' However, the IAEA failed to tell the Russian Federation that the proposed dumping was prohibited under the London
Convention until after the dumping took place, and failed to notify the
IMO or the other signatories to the London Convention.'
Naturally, Japan was not pleased with these developments. After
the October 17 dumping, in response to national outrage in Japan,
Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata phoned his Russian counterpart
Andrei Kozyrev to ask him to stop the second dump.' However, the
Russian Federation did not make this concession without pressing its
advantage. During a meeting between representatives of the Russian
Federation and Japan in Tokyo during December, the Russia claimed it
would be forced to dump radioactive waste again unless Japan put up
the money for an additional storage site.' Japan responded by offering
to provide a chemical tanker, with a storage of capacity of 5,000 to 25,000
tons, for the coastal area of the Russian Far East. Japan also agreed to
help build a facility on Russian soil that would solidify the liquid waste
and store the compact waste underground.' Japan seemed insistent
that the new facilities be used for the four unused tankers anchored in
the Russian Far East, rather than for waste from submarines that are still
in service.'
Curiously, a high ranking official of the Russian Foreign Ministry
commented that, although Russia was grateful to Japan for its offer to
cooperate in nuclear ecology, "unfortunately the inspection of a Japanese
tanker showed that it cannot be used as a safe storage of liquid nuclear
waste. Secondly, we can fill up one tanker and then what? Therefore, the
main workload has to be carried out by Russian vessels......
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Naoaki Usui, Mikhailov, in Tokyo, Pledges No More Waste Dumping in Japan Sea,
NUCLEONICS WEEK, Oct. 28, 1993, at 10.
27. Satoshi Isaka, Moscow's Brinkmanship Tries Tokyo's Patience:Russian Requestfor Disposal
Assistance Meets Cagey Response, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Dec. 27, 1993, at 24.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Russia: Prospectsfor Cooperationwith Japanon Dumping of Nuclear Waste, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
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Obviously, the Russian Federation, despite its new "openness," feels
strongly about retaining control over its own dumping of nuclear waste.
This desire to retain authority over its own affairs continues to be seen
in the Russian Federation's refusal to sign on to the most recent
modification of the London Convention.
London Convention
The London Convention was originally signed in 1972 by the
world's major maritime and industrial states. 1 The Convention outlined
certain rules as to what could be dumped in the sea. A ban on dumping
heavily radioactive waste was instituted at once, followed by a ten-year
moratorium in 1983 on depositing slightly or moderately radioactive
substances in the sea.32 A motion proposed by Denmark and adopted in
November, 1993, calls for an absolute and unconditional ban on dumping
any nuclear waste in the seas. This agreement follows the Ocean
Dumping Ban Act of 1988, enacted by the United States, which is an
attempt to end dumping of industrial waste and sewage sludge at sea.
"An earlier version of the act permit[ted] dumping low-level waste at sea
only if 'designated findings had been made by the Environmental
Protection Agency."" Russia is now the only country refusing to ratify
the absolute ban on dumping radioactive materials in the sea. However,
upon entry into force of this amendment, the International Maritime
Organization announced that Russia had pledged to "endeavor to avoid
pollution of the sea by dumping of wastes."' Many groups are not
convinced, however; Greenpeace had this to say on Russia's refusal to
comply: "I]n spite of offers of aid from the international community, and
the scientific and technical resources available in Russia, the authorities
have chosen to persist in their irresponsible, incompetent, and isolationist
attitudes, which could lead to increased pollution in the oceans due to the
dumping of radioactive military waste." Only time will tell whether
Russia will be able to keep its pledge.

31. Gamini Seneviratne, IAEA Accused of Supporting Russian Radwaste Dumping,
NUCLEONICS WEEK, Nov. 11, 1993, at 14.

32. Nuclear Waste: Russia Alone in Dumping Radioactive Waste in the Sea, EUROPE ENERGY,
Mar. 4, 1994, No. 419, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
33. Nuclear Dumping Ban, supra note 18, at 18.
34. Radioactive Waste Dumping Ban at Sea Takes Effect, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Feb. 21,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
35. Nuclear Waste: Russia Alone in Dumping Radioactive Waste in the Sea, supra note 32, at
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III. HOW CAN OUR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL EXPERIENCE
INFORM OUR NUCLEAR WASTE CONTROL FUTURE?
The Role of On-Site Inspection
On-site inspection has been a useful means of reducing conflict
in arms control negotiations. So where have on-site inspection provisions
in arms control agreements been helpful in reducing threats to peace and
security? On-site inspection provisions have been most useful where they:
1) increase certainty (or trust, to use a more value-laden term); or 2)
increase information. These factors do not operate independently of one
another, but are interrelated.
Take, for example, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the
longest running examples of an arms control treaty incorporating on-site
inspection provisions. 6 The NPT is founded on the policy belief that
control over the nuclear materials used in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy is as important as control over nuclear armaments themselves.37
To this end, a system of "safeguards" was developed to provide assurance
that the materials and equipment used in peaceful nuclear activities are
not diverted to use in nuclear weapons programs.' This complex
accounting system continues to be administered by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 9 Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon
parties must accept IAEA safeguards and IAEA inspectors for the
purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligation not to acquire
nuclear weapons. 4°
The long experience with IAEA safeguards has helped to improve
the quality and consistency of information about nuclear materials and
equipment globally.41 While it is impossible to say how many non-nuclear weapons states would have become nuclear weapons states without
the NPT, it is probable that the NPT was instrumental in reducing
nuclear proliferation. Since the implementation of the NPT, only Israel,

36. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161.
37. MASON WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMs

CONTROL 58 (1969).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. III, supra note 36.
41. Note, however, that this information is far from perfect. Many nations, including the
United States, have questioned the accuracy of the IAEA accounting methods and systems
of controlling the international trade and exchange of nuclear technology and materials. See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL: THE
SEARCH FOR A MORE STABLE PEACE 60 (1983).
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India, Pakistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria
have either officially or non-officially joined the nuclear club. 42 Without
the exchange of information made possible through on-site inspection by
the IAEA, the certainty or "trust" among nuclear and non-nuclear weapon
nations would probably have not resulted.
On the downside, on-site inspection provisions have been less
than helpful in reducing threats to peace and security where: 1) they have
been a "deal-breaker" in treaty negotiations or 2) the cost was too high,
either financially or politically. These two factors are interrelated. If the
cost is too high, either financially or politically, an on-site inspection
provision can be a deal-breaker in treaty negotiations. This dynamic
occurred in several arms control treaty negotiations between the United
States and the Soviet Union.' Also, State One will sometimes make
on-site inspection a crucial element in a treaty, knowing the provision
will be a deal-breaker for State Two, because the cost to State One of the
proposed arms control is simply too high. The United States used this
tactic in several arms control negotiations with the USSR."
Now that on-site inspection in the arms control context has been
discussed, the next question is whether these ideas are transferable to the
environmental context, in particular to the problem of Russian dumping
of radioactive wastes into the oceans.
Lack of Certainty or Trust
There is a problem of certainty and trust when it comes to the
problem of radioactive dumping in the former Soviet Union, or any
dumping worldwide for that matter. Currently, there is not any one
overarching international agency or association that monitors nuclear
dumping in the seas.' As noted above, the International Maritime
Organization sponsors the London Convention, but it does not purport
to monitor the agreement. In the absence of international authority, then,
we should look to domestic Russian law to see whether it will be
adequate to control Russian nuclear waste dumping.

42. ROBERT D. BLACKWELL & ALBERT CARNESALE, NEW NUCLEAR NATIONS: CONSEQUENCES
FOR US. POLICY 36 (1993).
43. See generally COSTIN ET AL., supra note 4.

44. Id.
45. Currently, the IAEA says it has only a technical role in the IMO-to define high-level
radioactive waste, recommend provisions under which dumping permits for other
radioactive wastes may be issued by the convention signatories, and regularly advise the
parties on technical matters. Seneviratne, supra note 31, at 14.
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Russian Law on Nuclear Dumping in the Seas
Little law exists in Russia regarding the dumping of nuclear
waste in the seas. Probably the most relevant law is the Russian
Federation Law, Protection of the Natural Environment (December 1991),
Article 50 of which, Ecological Requirements in the Use of Radioactive
Materials, provides:
The import of radioactive waste and materials from other
nations for storage or disposal purposes, and the sinking or
sending into space of radioactive waste and materials for
disposal purposes, is prohibited.'
The Yablokov report goes on to admit that "this law not only prohibits
the disposal of radioactive waste in the territorial waters of the Russian
Federation, it prohibits any disposal of radioactive waste on Russian
territory in any sea."47 However, as noted above, the Russian Federation
has acknowledged in the Yablokov report that it repeatedly has broken
its own laws.
Another set of relevant Russian Federation laws are the Rules
Governing Charges for Environmental Pollution, Waste Disposal, and Other
HazardousEffects, as confirmed by Russian Federation Government Decree
No. 632 of August 28, 1992.' The main purpose of these rules is to levy
charges for "several hazardous effects on the environment," including:
* emission into the atmosphere of pollutants from stationary and mobile
sources;
* dumping of pollutants into surface and underground bodies of
water;
* waste disposal; and
* other hazardous effects (noise, vibration, electromagnetic and
radiation effects, et cetera).
The law establishes charges for two tiers of pollution-for emissions
within acceptable standards, and for emissions within established limits
(i.e., temporarily agreed standards). Charges are fixed for each ingredient
of pollutant and type of hazardous effect, taking into account the degree
of hazard posed to the environment and to human health. Coefficients to
the basic charges will be established for individual regions and river
46. YABLOKOV REPoRT, supra note 5, at § 2.2.
47. Id.
48. Rules Governing Charges for Environmental Pollution, Waste Disposal and Other
Hazardous Effects, as confirmed by RF Government Decree No. 632 of Aug. 28, 1992,
availablein WESTLAW, RUSLINE Database, 1992 WL 474515 (Rus. Legis.).
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basins taking into account ecological factors and importance of natural
and sociocultural objects.49
Although it is not entirely clear from this set of rules, it appears
that in order to release emissions a "user of nature" must be in possession
of "a duly perfected emission-dumping-disposal permit."' If the polluter
is not in possession of such a permit, the whole mass of pollutants will
be regarded as being over and above the limit.5' In this case, charges
for the over-limit of pollution will be determined by multiplying the
respective charge rates for pollution within the established limits by the
magnitude of excess of the actual mass of emitted pollutants, volume of
disposed waste, and hazardous effect levels over and above the established limits.52 Once these figures are summed, they are multiplied by
a five-fold increase coefficient.'
While these rules represent a positive step toward stemming the
flow of nuclear waste into the seas, they fall short in many respects. First,
the Rules only apply to "enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and
foreign legal and natural persons engaged in any type of activity on
Russian Federation territory involving the use and management of
nature."' The majority of the problems to date have resulted from
dumping by Russian governmental agencies or by Russian military units.
While the law does not define "enterprises, institutions, or organizations,"
it is likely that neither the Russian government nor the military are
obligated by this particular law. Second, it is not clear what "acceptable
standards" for pollution are under this law. Are the standards set
"case-by-case," or are they set per type of pollutant? When it comes to
radioactive waste dumping in rivers and oceans any level of radioactive
contamination may create objectionable environmental and health risks.
There are other Russian laws that bear upon the problem of
radioactive waste, but they relate more to the preservation of lands and
the use of subsoil. The Statute of State Monitoring of Land Use and
Protection does mention the dumping of radioactive substances, but the
agencies involved only enforce the prevention of littering of lands and
the pollution of soils. The Statute of Charges of Use of Subsoil, Water, and
Seabed Areas also discusses radioactive waste, but only in conjunction with
extracting subsoil minerals.' These laws have many of the same
49. Id. cl.2.
50. Id. ci. 6.
51. Id.
52. Id. cl.
5.
53. Id.
54. Id. cl.
1.
55. RF Government Decree No. 594, availablein WESTLAW, RUSLINE Database, 1992 WL
472550 (Rus. Legis.).
56. Statute of Charges for Use of Subsoil, Water, and Seabed Areas, RF Government
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problems as the Rule Governing Chargesdiscussed above. They only apply
to the amorphous institutions, enterprises, and organizations, not
government entities, and the details of enforcement and standards within
these laws are not clear.
It is obvious that Russian internal regulations are not yet
sufficient to convince the rest of the world that radioactive waste will not
be dumped into the seas. Since Russia refuses to sign the latest amendment to the London Conference, and as of yet there is no international
monitoring authority, some external check on Russian dumping must be
explored to increase certainty and trust among nations. Because of this
lack of certainty, on-site inspection of Russian waste facilities and oceans
surrounding Russia would reduce threats to security.
Lack of Information
There is also a lack of information with regard to the problem of
Russian dumping. Although the Yablokov report is a step in the right
direction, little information about Russian dumping has been available
from Russian sources. It is not clear the extent to which the various
Russian agencies communicate with one another. The recent troubles
between Boris Yeltsin and the Russian military suggest that the relationship among various governmental agencies in Russia is not always
cooperative and harmonious. Diminished economic resources for Russia
also mean that things like nuclear waste disposal, and monitoring of
waste discharges, have a lower priority than ever.'
The international community is beginning to step into the
information breach, but not with any coordination. Upon discovery of the
thirty-five ocean nuclear dump sites used by the former Soviet Union,
scientists associated with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution met
to assess environmental damage.ss The groups consisted of 116 representatives from ten countries, including twenty-four Russian scientists s
The group concluded that "any potential problem would be a local one
and would pose no threat on a global scale. "' However, the group
recognized a lack of information, and revealed that Norway, Russia, and
the United States were planning a total of five research cruises to the

Decree No. 828, available in WESTLAW, RUSLINE Database, 1992 WL 472599 (Rus. Legis.).
57. Russia's threats to Japan regarding dumping nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan
evidence this lack of resources. See supra text accompanying notes 18-30.
58. David Arnold, Waste Threat Called Slight-No Wide Contamination Seen From Dumped
Soviet Reactors, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1993, at 38.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Barents, Kara, and Norwegian seas to assess the situation further.61 The
Woods Hole group made several recommendations to improve information flow:
* Declassification of all data regarding nuclear material dumped
overboard.
* A continuing series of international workshops to compare data and
develop models for better understanding radioactive decay in the
ocean.
• Establishment of universal standards for scientific sampling and
recordkeeping.
• A closer study of the dumpsites and human populations living in
regions near the sites.62
In addition, the eight Arctic nations--Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States-in 1991,
adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, which includes an
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program to "promote international
efforts to protect the Arctic environment and its native peoples."' The
monitoring program sent scientists on boat trips to sample waters from
western Russia to Alaska's Beaufort Sea." Although a positive step, the
group does not focus exclusively on radioactive dumping in the seas, and
is severely underprioritized and underfunded.'
In addition to these multilateral efforts, Japan and Russia have
agreed to carry out the first joint study to assess the environmental
impact of Russia's past dumping of nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan.
Research vessels from the two nations will conduct a 31-day survey of
the areas where the dumping occurred. They will be joined by South
Korea.'
However, this excursion is largely the result of a single
crisis-the international community needs to implement a more regular,
consistent program of nuclear waste monitoring.
As mentioned above, the IAEA is not prepared to take on the
task of monitoring nuclear waste dumping in the oceans, nor is it
currently enabled by any treaty to take on this duty. The IMO only gives
them a "technical role," although this may change, as we shall see in later
sections.

61. Id. See generally 8 ARCTIC RESEARCH OF THE UNITED STATES, Spring 1994.
62. Id.
63. Hajost & Pfirman, supra note 17, at 18.

64. Conference Details Extent of Pollution in Arctic, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 6, 1993, at 4.
65. Hajost & Pfirman, supra note 17, at 18."
66. Isaka, supra note 27, at 24.
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Problems of On-Site Inspection
It is not likely that on-site inspection in and of itself would be a
deal-breaker for Russia. The trend in international agreements has been
toward accepting more and more intrusive means of verification. For
example, the PNET and INF treaties incorporated more intrusive on-site
inspection provisions than ever accepted before by the former Soviet
Union.'
Although not on the subject of nuclear arms control, the
Chemical Weapons Convention breaks many barriers to verification,
incorporating challenge inspections and anytime, anyplace inspections. 8
The more difficult question is whether the costs of inspection will be too
much for Russia and other signatories to a multilateral convention
permitting such inspection.
Costs of On-Site Inspection
The costs of on-site inspection could be quite high and may be
unacceptable not only to the Russian Federation, but to the rest of the
world. Since many respectable scientists have dismissed Russian
dumping of low-level radioactive waste as harmless,0 Russia and many
others in the global community may simply consider the cost of on-site
inspection too high. If an agreement to verify were adopted multilaterally, there may well be other nations who object to intrusive inspection of
their nuclear programs, such as the United States and North Korea.
One Russian scientist, Vladimir Lakimets of the Russian Academy
Sciences, said he hoped the United States would be as candid about
aspects of the submarine Scorpion, lost off the Azores in 1968, as the
Russians have been about the Komsolets, lost off the coast of Norway in
198970 "We would all gain much if we knew the state of the reactor on
the Scorpion and corrosion coefficients (a means to estimate the rate of
leakage from the submarine)."" He also pointed out that the United
States has been less than forthcoming about the way liquid and solid
nuclear waste is stored on land.'
In addition to the high political cost of permitting multilateral
on-site inspection of nuclear waste dumping in the oceans, the financial
cost is also likely to be high. Countries which have been dumping

67. See generally On-Site Inspection Database, supra note 3.
68. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
69. Arnold, supra note 58, at 38.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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radioactive waste "free of charge" into the oceans would need to build
land storage sites-an expensive proposition. Then there are the costs
associated with actually monitoring a multilateral agreement-the cost of
the research cruises, scientists, and maintaining an organization to
implement such an agreement. A unique problem presents itself-the
nuclear nations which most need monitoring are those in the best
position to pay for that monitoring. However, it is not necessarily in their
"national interest" to have their own nuclear disposal practices exposed
to other members of the international community. This will be a difficult
problem to overcome.
Solutions
The problem of maritime dumping of radioactive waste is
complicated. However, information must be gathered about the extent of
dumping so that solutions to the dilemma can be found. This information
must be gathered not only for the Russian Federation, but for all nuclear
nations. The most reasonable solution would be to expand the role of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in coordination with the
International Maritime Organization and possibly the U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. In addition to its task of administering
safeguards controlling nuclear materials and equipment, the IAEA could
send inspectors to trouble spots in the oceans to measure levels of
radioactivity. These measurements need to be taken in a consistent,
universal, and standardized fashion.
Other monitoring strategies could also be considered, perhaps
similar to the portal-perimeter monitoring under the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces Treaty. More intermediate solutions might include conditioning
aid from the United States, the United Nations, or the World Bank on
adherence to environmental standards.' Additional aid should be
earmarked specifically for building new land-based sites.
To improve environmental waste disposal laws in countries
producing radioactive waste, the International Maritime Organization
could work on developing a model code which would guide development of domestic laws. Bolstering the strength of domestic laws would
be akin to confidence-building measures in the Conventional Forces in

73. Under recently introduced legislation, (H.R. 1798), only Russia and Belarus would be
eligible immediately for previously appropriated assistance funneled through the U.S.
Department of Energy, because the aid would go only to countries that have joined the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This bill would also require the identification and
assessment of contaminated sites, along with ranking of priorities for their cleanup. Bill
Would Peg EnvironmentalAid to Joining Non-ProliferationTreaty, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No.
336 (May 5, 1993).
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Europe Treaty.74 Model codes have improved the quality of law in many
areas. For example, the International Law Commission's recommendations regarding water law and the law on reparations after nationalization
have given some direction to the development of domestic laws.7'
The problem of nuclear waste dumping in the world's oceans has
not developed overnight, nor will it go away that quickly. However,
through cooperative measures such as the inspection and monitoring
programs discussed above, progress can be made toward ensuring that
our oceans do not become heavily polluted by radioactive wastes.
McDougal defines international law as "a process by which the peoples
of the world clarify and implement their common interests in the shaping
and sharing of values.' 76 The world's peoples cannot begin to implement their common interests in the area of maritime nuclear waste unless
they can get accurate information. On-site inspection and monitoring of
maritime nuclear waste would be a valuable first step in gathering such
information. Although the solution to these problems will be difficult, the
potentially disastrous results of inaction represent a far worse alternative.

74. See generally On-Site Inspection Database, supra note 3.
75. For example, see the work done by the ILA Water Resources Committee, including
the Draft Articles for Remedies for Transboundary Damage in International Watercourses,
Rome, 9-11 February, 1994.
76. Myres McDougal et al., The World ConstitutiveProcessof Authoritative Decision,in 1 THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73-154 passim (Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black
eds., 1969).

